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Who is Responsible in Winter? Traffic Accidents, the 
Fight against Hazardous Weather and the  
Role of Law in a History of Risks 
Peter Itzen ∗ 
Abstract: »Wer ist im Winter verantwortlich? Verkehrsunfälle, der Kampf gegen 
gefährliches Wetter und die Rolle des Rechts in der Risikogeschichte«. This pa-
per analyses the role of law in modern risk debates. Inspired by concepts of his-
torical anthropology, it proposes to put more effort into the historical analysis 
of law and legal debates in order to understand long-term change in the histo-
ry of everyday life. The paper takes the discussions on the establishment of a 
winter service in Germany in the first decades of the twentieth century as an 
example for this, and demonstrates how legal experts reflected changed per-
ceptions of both nature and related everyday risks and gave them a practical 
legal meaning by integrating them into existing and widely accepted legal con-
cepts. By doing so, the legal discourse on hazardous weather conditions added 
significantly to the paradigm shift towards a greater role of the state in the 
mitigation of everyday risks. As in other debates on everyday risks, law func-
tioned as a hinge between risk perception and risk management. 
Keywords: Everyday risks, nature, historical anthropology, law, traffic accidents, 
National Socialism. 
1.  A Curious Incident in January 18501 
It was an arduous journey that the French ambassador to Russia, General de 
Castelbajac, and his wife had to endure when they returned to Russia during the 
heavy winter weather of January, 1850. Originally, they had planned to travel 
by rail. Heavy winter storms, however, forced them to try to travel through 
snowy East Europe with a normal horse carriage. But even this traditional and 
well-tested method of transport could not cope with the arduous weather condi-
tion. On the 20th of January, in Silesia, the French ambassador’s already very 
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uncomfortable journey came to a sudden halt. The snow-covered road made it 
so difficult to manoeuvre the carriage that it fell over, tipping the ambassador 
and his wife out of the carriage onto the snow, causing slight injuries. The 
carriage was damaged, so the ambassador was forced to spend the night in 
Lublinitz, a small town in Silesia. Without warning, its inhabitants now had to 
attend to the annoyed honourable couple, including finding appropriate ac-
commodation for them. In his report to the Prussian authorities, the District 
Administrator of Lublinitz, Landrat Koscielski, argued that neither the town of 
Lublinitz nor the surrounding county had any responsibility for what had hap-
pened. Admittedly, the streets had been heavily covered with snow and could 
not easily be used by carriages. But the Landrat argued that this was not the 
cause of the accident. Rather, Koscielski continued, a thorough investigation of 
the accident had shown that the carriage had not been properly loaded, the 
runners had not been renewed and – most importantly – the driver was not 
skilled in steering a carriage through heavy winter weather. The Prussian home 
office was satisfied with the explanation and the next day the French couple 
continued their strenuous journey to St. Petersburg.2  
It may seem a bit bizarre to begin an article that mainly deals with the twen-
tieth century with an episode from the middle of the nineteenth century. How-
ever, the example from 1850 allows me to more clearly demonstrate how the 
concept of risk and risk prevention has changed from the nineteenth century to 
the current age, dominated by automobile traffic systems. Nowadays, great 
efforts are made to clear the roads of snow and to facilitate transport even in 
times of harsh and very difficult weather conditions. To be able to get from one 
point to another without risking one’s health is regarded as an essential element 
of a complex, mobile and highly sophisticated society that prides itself on its 
infrastructures that allow for easy and swift transport in nearly all circumstanc-
es. Hence, it is not only the provision of infrastructure that is seen as a core 
element of modern statehood, but also the ability to use it – and to do so with-
out putting anyone at great risk. While the first element became important 
during the emergence of the modern state and trade capitalism in early modern 
Europe, the latter was mainly an invention of the twentieth century.3 From a 
historical perspective of risk – and particularly of everyday risks – this change 
from a provision of roads to a provision of safe roads implied another im-
portant paradigmatic change, the change from individual responsibility to a 
shared responsibility that implied a new role of the state in the provision of 
security and safety. This article is based on the thesis that one of the most im-
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portant reasons for this change in risk mitigation culture was the influence of 
legal conceptions and debates on the perception of risks and their mitigation. 
2.   The History of Everyday Risks, Law and Historical 
Anthropology  
Everyday risks seem to be a constant element of all human societies. Transport 
in itself, for instance, was always a risky enterprise. Robbery, technical failure 
of the transport vehicle or a collision with another transport vehicle is always 
possible; we know from archival material on post coaches that accidents must 
have happened quite often. Why should we as historians be bothered to analyse 
a phenomenon that seems to lack a significant historical dynamic and is often 
regarded as a ‘natural’ or ‘self-evident’ element of human life? I see three 
major reasons for this:  
Firstly, historians studying everyday risks can help to understand historical 
notions of self-evidence and how they change. Historical anthropology deals – 
in the words of the historian and cultural anthropologist, Jochen Martin – with 
the ‘change of constant things.’ By using that phrase, Martin alludes to basic 
human experiences, their perception, possible changes and to the question of how 
these experiences become or cease to be self-evident (Martin 2006; see also 
Reinhard 2004, 11). The perception of one’s own body, the relationship to other 
humans and the relationship towards nature are typical examples of these basic 
experiences, and so are everyday risks like traffic accidents, especially when they 
occur in connection with difficult or challenging weather conditions. Martin 
describes these basic experiences as challenges because they often reveal the 
contrast between how things are and how things should be. He exemplifies this 
with adolescence, which is regarded as a self-evident phase in the development of 
human beings, but which is biologically neither necessary nor does adolescence 
always progress in the same manner in terms of its length and implications. What 
is seen as self-evident is therefore subject to change. It is this change of self-
evidence, its loss and its rethinking, which can be witnessed in relation to traf-
fic accidents during the course of the first half of the twentieth century. With 
regard to traffic accidents, there are expectations as to whether they are ac-
ceptable, how they can be confronted and how they should be dealt with once 
they occur.  
An interest in ‘the change of constant things’ can, secondly, offer chronolo-
gies, causalities and narratives that differ from established readings in political, 
social and economic history. Attitudes and expectations concerning age change 
at a different and mostly slower pace than political structures (though both 
developments might be related to each other). The same goes for debates and 
expectations concerning everyday risks: The political and social debates of the 
day often leave out constant things like the experience of everyday risks – or 
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these discussions take place on a slightly more obscure expert level. This is 
easily explained with what Gerd Gigerenzer has called ‘social learning’ 
(Gigerenzer o. J. [2015]): People base their assessment of risky situations not 
on the grounds of critical, analytical reasoning, but on what they experience as 
acceptable social practice. Thus, radiation from mobile phones may appear 
extremely dangerous while motorised traffic seems to be normal and fairly 
secure even though it claims many thousands of lives each year. Yet if the 
assessment of these risks changes it also signals changes in other fields of 
historical development, as for instance when scientific research became in-
creasingly aware of the risk of smoking in the second half of the twentieth 
century (Berridge 2003). Additionally, analysing everyday risks as historians 
focuses scientific attention on a huge social problem that is often underestimat-
ed by historians and social scientists. After all, while military conflicts deeply 
affect people’s life, everyday risks often have a stronger impact. How we expe-
rience these risks is the result of cultural, social and political path-
dependencies, but they can also determine and change these path dependencies.  
Thirdly, historians studying risks can contribute to our understanding of so-
cietal conceptions of social justice. The management of everyday risks and the 
changing manner in which we cope with such risks are important indicators for 
the meaning of social justice in a society. A history of the management of and 
reactions to risks can offer an important tool to describe the character and 
change of social justice conceptions. The connection between everyday risks 
and concepts of social justice may not seem very obvious, but the link is, in 
fact, a very close one. Concepts of social justice deal with finding a socially 
acceptable relationship between individual rights on the one side and the public 
interest and community rights on the other (Böckenförde 1999), and this rela-
tionship is constitutive for the perception of risks, their mitigation and devel-
opment. Tolerability of risks and debates about them always deal with the 
conflict between an individual’s freedom of action and the distribution of the 
accompanying dangers and resulting costs.  
With regard to traffic accidents, this becomes clear in two ways: First, in 
most cases they involve two different parties with a different set of interests 
and social backgrounds. This is most obvious when, for instance, a car or a 
coach collides with another car or coach, or runs over a pedestrian or cyclist. In 
the most favourable circumstances only material damage and minor injuries 
have to be dealt with; in tragic circumstances, injured persons need to be hospital-
ised or the relatives of deceased persons must find ways to deal with the loss of a 
loved one who often was the breadwinner of the family. Whether and how help in 
these circumstances is organised and what kind of institutions are seen as having 
responsibility for handling these situations is linked to notions of social justice 
that are often more permanent than the change of political regimes and institu-
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tions.4 The second reason is the sheer scale of the problem – and how this prob-
lem is evaluated publicly. The connection becomes rather obvious when one 
considers, for example, West Germany in the 1970s, where 19,000 people were 
killed annually in car accidents and more than 500,000 people were injured 
(Klenke 1995, 50); but traffic accidents were a widespread phenomenon al-
ready at the beginning of the twentieth century, triggering the question of how 
a society can finance the immense costs of these risks. An analysis of traffic 
accidents as an example of widespread everyday risks can therefore also serve 
to exemplify notions of social justice, practices of social redistribution and 
ideas of social responsibility.  
Finally, what is the role of the law in all this? Law is the main regulator of 
the relationship between individual freedom and community rights and is there-
fore also the central element for the regulation of risks. However, law is not 
only the main technical regulator that distributes costs, risks and responsibili-
ties; it is also constitutive for the emergence of social expectations and notions 
of self-evidence. Yet law also needs widespread acceptance. Hence, changing 
notions of self-evidence most often lead to a change of the meaning of law. A 
shift in public expectations will also affect the meaning and the normative 
consequences of legal concepts. In other words: Law is the cultural institution 
that connects the perception and regulation of risks. The general interconnect-
edness between legal debates and public expectations and notions of self-
evidence is long since accepted among legal scholars (Würtenberger 1991). Yet 
among historians, the role of law has long been neglected as a historical force 
in its own right (Grimm 2000).  
3.   Traffic Accidents, Hazardous Nature and the 
Regulatory System in the Pre-Automobile World 
The incident in Silesia in 1850 with which this article was introduced is an 
example of how normal accidents and the difficulties of travel during winter 
time were regarded by the Prussian administration – and presumably also by 
the public. This occurrence found its way into the Prussian Home Office papers 
only because an ambassador, and hence matters of state, were involved. Up 
until the end of the nineteenth century, there was hardly any reliable data avail-
able about any form of traffic accidents. Only when persons holding important 
public offices were involved in accidents or, alternatively, when important 
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economic interests were affected do we find records of accidents in the pre-
automobile era.5  
The aforementioned lack of any kind of even primitive statistics regarding 
traffic accidents is therefore most likely not an indication of the rarity of the 
phenomenon, but of its relative economic or political irrelevance at the time 
and, possibly, also for its normality. Accidents with horse-drawn carriages 
were probably quite commonplace (Möser 2008, 65). The technical quality of 
traditional transport vehicles was poor and prone to malfunctions. Still, since 
the beginning in the seventeenth century, attempts had been made to continu-
ously improve the technical quality of transport vehicles (Popplow 2008, 101-
4). Efficient control of horses was even more important. Horses easily pan-
icked, causing damage and injuries. Here, too, some innovations had been 
introduced (such as improved blinkers), but it is unclear how effective these 
measures actually were (Poppe 1837, 321). Yet accidents were not only fre-
quent, they also often had grave consequences. The state of medical research 
and knowledge made any possible injury following an accident potentially far 
more dangerous than in the later twentieth century. Not only were there few 
possibilities to stop or compensate for major, potentially life-threatening bleed-
ing. Also, the aftereffects of injuries resulting from accidents could be rather 
disagreeable. Before the discovery of germs at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry and the invention of antibiotics in the 1940s, even injuries that were not 
instantly life threatening could ultimately develop into a serious health hazard 
(Porter 1997; 2006, 200).  
Harsh weather conditions made road traffic and other forms of transport an 
even more risky enterprise – sometimes so risky that no means of transport was 
possible (Behringer 2003, 98, 543). This was, of course, particularly true for 
the winter. The winter season in itself presents challenges to human life, de-
manding capabilities for food preservation or heating, sometimes leading to 
conflicts between the population and local government about the use of wood 
from forests (Brüggemeier 2014, 68). A harsh winter could threaten the supply 
of food and thus threaten the welfare of the whole society. Extreme winters like 
the one of 1739/40 were traumatic experiences for the middle-European society 
(Behringer 2007, 209-11).  
In the nineteenth century, whoever travelled in winter by coach through Eu-
rope was engaging in a dangerous activity at a dangerous time. To facilitate 
travel in the winter, coaches were drawn on runners, but that neither guaranteed 
swift progress nor a safe journey. For one thing, by far not all roads were 
cleared from snow; only some regions were familiar with the use of snow-
                                                             
5  As early as the seventeenth century, postal office services in some German territories kept 
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ploughs. These technical deficiencies were mirrored by an interesting lack of 
regulation concerning safety features for both carriages and roads. Although 
the cold climate and harsh winters that dominated Europe during the ‘little ice 
age’ and thereafter had contributed to the rise of the state and regulative re-
gimes in Europe, this development had little effect on travel conditions during 
the winter. The increasing amount of regulations mainly dealt with codes of 
practices for the subjects of a state (Becker 2005, 361-5). Accordingly, alt-
hough there was no systematic law code on traffic regulation in Prussia in 
1850, a long list of legal regulations existed.6 Yet most of these regulations had 
the sole aim of protecting the streets from damage, while driver and passenger 
safety was regarded as less important. For instance, as traffic increasingly 
crossed administrative borders within Germany, one of the main interests was 
to precisely regulate the width of the axles, thereby ensuring that the roads 
were evenly used by the various carriages and coaches.7  
Very few regulations at all dealt with traffic regulation during winter time – 
and if they existed they primarily had the function to protect the road rather 
than the driver or to keep the road free from snow, an obligation that was, 
however, limited to built-up areas.8 Accordingly, the use of snow chains was 
strictly regulated because the Prussian administration was afraid their use might 
otherwise damage the road.9 Such regulations concerning hazardous road con-
ditions during winter time were representative of the general risk regulation 
system of the pre-automobile era. Hardly any general rules concerning the 
prevention or the regulation of accidents and crashes existed at all. Instead 
responsibility for risk-taking therefore lay almost entirely with the road users.  
4.   The Establishment of a New Risk Regime at the 
Beginning of the Twentieth Century 
This traditional relationship between risk and responsibility got challenged by 
the increasingly widespread introduction of insurances against risks during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following earlier developments that 
had introduced insurance as a tool to deal with risks (such as, for instance, in 
shipping) railway accidents and hazards at workplaces led to the establishment 
of a new risk regime with new concepts of responsibility (Mohun 2013; Zwier-
                                                             
6  Cf. Ludwig von Rönne, Die Wege-Polizei und das Wege-Recht des Preußischen Staates, 
Breslau 1852. 
7  Cf. I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 1328, Nr. 3 Bd. 1. 
8  An example for such an obligation can be found in a decree of the state of Baden from 
1884: Vollzugsordnung zum Straßengesetz. Offenhaltung der öffentlichen Wege bei 
Schnee-Anhäufungen, Karlsruhe 1885. 
9  This topic will be further explored below. 
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lein 2011; Brüggemeier 1996, 133-51, 199-215). These new concepts shifted 
the focus away from the individual and placed the burden of controlling and 
mitigating these risks, as well as compensating for them, on new institutions 
(for instance the Berufsgenossenschaften in Germany). The costs of these risks 
were often shared among the partakers of insurance companies. Introduced in 
1884, the Berufsgenossenschaften were financed by companies and took over 
from them the financial risks of workplace accidents, which gave them the 
financial incentive to invest both in research on the causes of accidents and in 
the development of safety campaigns. During the 1920s, this development 
gathered considerable speed (Knoll-Jung 2015) and also included campaigns 
against traffic accidents once the Berufsgenossenschaften had to compensate 
for them as well.10 In the course of this general development, the old ‘vernacu-
lar’ (Arwen Mohun) risk regime was first accompanied, then gradually re-
placed by a new expert culture of risk regimes (Mohun 2013; Moses 2012).  
Equally important, however, was the fact that this newly emerging risk re-
gime was reflected in debates among lawyers and became highly legalised 
(Moses 2012, 59-61). Its new legal principles developed path dependencies that 
influenced the regulation of risks other than those they were primarily made to 
deal with. This also applied to the emerging automobile traffic in the early 
twentieth century. In the course of the initial controversies about the dangerous 
nature of this new kind of mobility, legal experts of the federal government and 
of the governments of several German states, as well as public academic ex-
perts, looked at practices and concepts that had already proved effective in 
relation to railway and workplace accidents, such as the establishment of com-
pulsory insurance systems or the legal regulation of an operational hazard 
(Merki 2002, 321-5, 354-60).11 
The first law on automobile traffic in Germany was passed in 1909 and 
firmly put the burden of any car accident on the driver. While this seems to 
follow the same approach to individual responsibility that had been in place 
prior to the automobile age, it was actually an important departure from earlier 
principles in two respects: First, the reason for this kind of regulation was that 
many of the earlier car accidents involved pedestrians who were injured or 
even killed in the course of these crashes. Hence, the law aimed mainly at 
protecting pedestrians. By contrast, in the nineteenth century, for accidents that 
involved both pedestrians and horse-drawn coaches, the question of liability 
had to be settled in each case before compensation could be granted to an in-
jured person. There was no burden of proof on either side. From a pedestrian’s 
perspective, the automobile law had therefore completely abandoned the prin-
ciple of individual responsibility. Secondly, as a consequence of the new law 
                                                             
10  Cf. for instance the Unfallverhütungswoche (campaign against accidents) in 1928: BArch R 
112/281. 
11  Cf. for the debate e.g. BArch R 1501/113938- R1501/113962. 
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charging the car driver with the burden of proof, soon a flourishing business of 
vehicle insurances emerged, effectively taking the onus away from most of the 
car drivers and thus modifying the idea of personal responsibility (Fraunholz 
2002; Merki 2002; 1999, 64).  
Yet possibly even more influential was the legal development that followed 
the establishment of the new regulations in Germany. Lawyers began to discuss 
whether a driver could be held responsible in situations that lay beyond his 
control. Concepts like the ‘moment of shock’ (Schrecksekunde) or the notion of 
an ‘inevitable event’ (unabwendbares Ereignis) suggested that it was, after all, 
not always the driver who could be blamed for a road accident (Kleffel 1933). 
That could be the case if, for instance, a pedestrian crossed a road in such a 
way that the car driver could not possibly see him before he ran him over. The 
concept of the ‘inevitable event’ recognised that accidents were sometimes 
triggered by causes that were beyond the control of car drivers and thus 
strengthened their legal position. These scientific debates had fundamental 
consequences – they heightened the awareness of the complexity of risks and 
they thus tended to turn the person who had been seen as responsible for a risk 
into a person who was affected by a risk. 
It goes without saying that winter weather could also create ‘inevitable 
events,’ for instance when streets were covered with black ice. The legal situa-
tion concerning an obligation to strew sand or salt on slippery roads or to re-
move snow was, however, complicated and contradictory. A general obligation 
to care for the safety and security of roads was developed by the Supreme 
Court of the Reich as early as in 1903. This Verkehrssicherungspflicht was the 
result of an interpretation of civil law principles that dealt with the duty of 
private owners of land that was open to public traffic. Potentially it also includ-
ed the duty to strew sand or salt against slippery roads. Yet during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, legal experts largely agreed that such an 
obligation did not exist, especially not outside of built-up areas. The rationale 
of this legal position was a purely economic one: lawyers and courts agreed 
that it would exceed the financial capabilities of the local institutions which 
were mostly charged with the Verkehrssicherungspflicht (Ketterer 1935, 83). 
The potential financial costs were also one of the central arguments why even 
the use of snow chains was highly controversial at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Occasionally, this led to conflicts between government ministries and 
local institutions. In 1913, for instance, the local administration of the post ser-
vices in the city of Regensburg complained about various threats from the police 
to bring criminal charges against those post coach drivers who made use of snow 
chains during winter weather.12 The police was justifying its actions with a law 
that originated in 1850 and forbade the use of any snow chains on roads that 
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were not fully covered with snow. Even then, however, such a strict policy was 
met with objections. In 1912 and 1913, a lobbyist of the association of the 
German Automobile Producers (Verein Deutscher Motorfahrzeug-Industri-
eller) as well as private entrepreneurs filed inquiries about the possible use of 
snow chains in winter time. According to them, the chains presented the only 
possibility to avoid dangerous skidding on snowy and icy roads.13 
These attempts to change legal practice and allow for the use of snow chains 
in spite of the possible damage that these could inflict on the roads proved futile 
in most cases, but they signalled a change in the notion of winter and what could 
be done about it. While it did not alter the idea that the driver was ultimately 
responsible for any accident he caused, it did change the notion of winter as a 
time whose challenges more or less had to be accepted. The same is true of the – 
in the early twentieth century – newly emerging concept of Verkehrssicher-
ungspflicht: it did not entail an obligation for the state to provide safe roads 
outside of towns even during winter time, but it certainly changed the role of 
state institutions compared to the pre-automobile era. 
5.   The Winter, the Automobile and the Reichsautobahnen 
When, in the mid-1930s, the National Socialists tried to speed up motorisation 
in Germany, the risk regime concerning automobile traffic presented a mixed 
picture: On the one hand, challenges like hazardous weather had not quite lost 
their traditional character as risks that had to be accepted. On the other hand, 
the concept of individual responsibility for taking and causing risks had been 
increasingly challenged by new legal concepts – a development that went hand 
in hand with safety campaigns against accidents and that was now gathering 
speed by technical innovations and changed social practices, both affecting the 
way accidents were perceived by the public and legal experts alike. Although 
the National Socialist policy of widespread motorisation did, in the end, not 
prove successful, automobile traffic did become more popular and also more 
usual after the late 1920s (Möser 2002, 172-87). Increasingly, traffic experts 
also discussed the function and structure of roads, some of them arguing for 
their renovation and rebuilding to make them compatible for automobile traffic, 
some of them even arguing for separate roads for cars that were built solely 
according to their needs – a concept that was first successfully put into practice 
in the United States and in Italy (Möser 2002, 91-6).  
In Germany, a business consortium had been working on plans for a motor-
way system since the 1920s, but it was in the 1930s under the national socialist 
                                                             
13 BArch R 1501/113990, Königlicher Regierungspräsident to the Brewery Schönbeck, 15th 
November 1912; Verein Deutscher Motorfahrzeug-Industrieller to the Prussian Ministry of 
War, 28th November 1912. 
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regime that the nationwide system of motorways (Reichsautobahnen) was 
developed (Möser 2002, 180-2). When the motorways opened for traffic in the 
mid-1930s, complaints came in from road users that these roads were very 
dangerous and could cause fatal accidents.14 Winter was a particularly perilous 
time. Snowdrifts and black ice made parts of the Reichsautobahnen unpassable 
during the harsh winters of 1935/36 and 1936/37. For Fritz Todt, Inspector 
General for the German Road System (Generalinspektor für das deutsche 
Straßenwesen), who was responsible for organising road traffic in Germany, 
this situation was untenable. The motorways were not only a highly prestigious 
propaganda tool for the National Socialists and should therefore not be associ-
ated with danger and risk. They were also extremely expensive projects and 
Todt, an engineer by profession, regarded it as an impossible situation that 
these costly modern roads could develop into deadly traps during winter time.15 
For Todt, it was clear that the state institutions in charge had to ensure the 
availability of the motorways to the car drivers in the country regardless of the 
season. With this demand for a stronger role of state agencies in the provision 
of safe roads even during winter time, Todt found himself in line with busi-
nessmen who contacted him to complain about the difficulties of transport 
during the winter months, among them also Jan Assman, the chief executive of 
the Krupps Kraftfahrzeuge GmbH. In a letter dated March 1936, he complained 
about the “grievous consequences of black ice for the whole transport system.” 
In parts of Germany, he continued,  
the situation has been so difficult that huge financial assets in the form of cars, 
lorries, busses and tractors have been destroyed. Furthermore, for many days 
it has not been possible to make trips to other regions because it has proved 
impossible to keep the cars on the roads because of black ice.16  
Assmann assured Todt that the entire business community would very much 
welcome it if black ice were fought more effectively.  
This gentle reprimand was highly welcomed by Todt because it strength-
ened his belief that rural roads and the Reichsautobahnen had to be safe for use 
even during winter time. As a matter of fact, however, during the winter of 
1935/36, various reports about dangerous black ice and tragic accidents on the 
Reichsautobahnen reached the office of the Generalinspektor.17 The mere 
numbers did not quite justify Todt’s perception – for instance, during the first 
four months of 1937, a total of only 26 car accidents could be attributed to 
black ice, slightly more than eleven per cent of all road accidents on the 
Reichsautobahnen.18 Yet it was not the statistical evidence that concerned Todt 
                                                             
14  BArch R 4601/1104. 
15  BArch R 4601/518 Teil 1, Letter by Todt directed to the Audit Office, 6th July 1936. 
16  BArch R 4601/518 Teil 1, Letter by Assmann to Todt, 2nd March 1936. 
17  BArch R 4601/1104. 
18  BArch R 4601/1104, fol. 90. 
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and his staff in the office of the Generalinspektor and the motorways Head 
Office but the obvious contrast between a new technology and the sheer and 
sudden powerlessness in the face of natural forces, which seemed so frighten-
ing. As a consequence and in preparation of the coming winter, Todt decided to 
introduce an obligation to strew sand on icy parts of the Reichsautobahnen and 
those rural roads that fell within the jurisdiction of the Reich (Reichsstraßen).19 
In a letter to his subordinates, he asked his colleagues “to let go of the old 
untenable position that an obligation to grit does not exist.” The local admin-
istration, Todt continued, had to become familiar with the notion that, after the 
experiences of the winter of 1935/36, there must be no threat from black ice 
again. But as early as during the following winter Todt’s ambition proved to be 
unrealistic and he complained about ‘lax’ attitudes among the workers for the 
nascent winter service in the Reich.20 He was unwilling to accede to financial 
arguments: If his demand meant additional financial investments then these had 
to be accepted, Todt argued. To him, the fact that the Reichsautobahnen were 
such a costly enterprise meant that it was not tolerable that they could not be 
used over large parts of the year. 
The practical problems, however, were huge. Todt soon had to realise that 
his plans to prevent black ice on Reichsautobahnen and Reichsstraßen were 
difficult to put into practice. Not enough snow ploughs were available to com-
bat black ice swiftly, and there was hardly any substantial experience with 
winter maintenance on a large scale. Hence Todt’s office now followed a more 
pragmatic approach and recognised that natural dangers could not always be 
completely eliminated, but had to be dealt with practically. Consequently, 
many different solutions and approaches were now tested, for instance the use 
of so-called ice-flags which should be hung up in emergency cases and thus 
warn road users against black ice. Additionally, policemen should warn car 
drivers in cases of dangerous road conditions, and local construction workers 
should be kept on standby so that they could immediately start to grit the mo-
torways if necessary. Finally, the radio weather service was also expected to 
improve its information on weather conditions so that car drivers were warned 
earlier against possible dangers and could adjust their driving style and speed to 
road conditions.21  
These activities indicated a changed attitude towards nature. Its challenges 
now seemed to be technologically manageable – but not quite avoidable: The 
pragmatic solutions that Todt’s office sought in the attempt to make the 
Reichsautobahnen safe in winter time also exemplified the difficulties of the 
attempted technical solutions. Under these circumstances, a mixture between 
resilience and protection seemed to be the proper way to deal with the chal-
                                                             
19  BArch R 4601/518 Teil 1, Letter by Todt to his staff, 20 March 1936. 
20  Idid., Letter to the Head Office of the Reichsautobahnen, 30 November 1936. 
21  BArch R 4601/518 Teil 1. 
HSR 41 (2016) 1  │  166 
lenges of hazardous weather, at least initially.22 Unlike in the pre-automobile 
era, however, Todt’s office tried to solve the remaining problems by collecting 
and evaluating information about the various techniques that could be used to 
make snowy and icy roads safe.23 This information included the different expe-
riences with various kinds of snow ploughs in several regions of Germany, 
from which the office developed precise recommendations for the most effi-
cient method to remove snow and black ice from streets or to at least warn 
against them. For instance, in accordance with the experiences in the various 
regions in Germany, the office noticed that the speed with which the snow 
plough should drive and salt the roads was 25 kilometres per hour. Even the 
exact height at which ice flags should be put up was regulated.24 Yet the efforts 
to get a grip on the problem also included scientific research, for instance con-
cerning the kind of material that could be used to grit the roads.25  
These efforts indicated the hope and expectation that the risk that arose from 
voluntary exposure to natural hazards could be reduced by technical interven-
tion by state institutions. From a legal perspective, this development signalled 
an important shift. Beforehand, lawyers had justified the former exclusion of a 
winter service from the general Verkehrssicherungspflicht with the assumption 
that such an obligation was technically and economically impossible to fulfil. 
This argument was under threat once state institutions seemed to prove that a 
winter service was, after all, possible. It is therefore little wonder that the initia-
tives by Todt and his office were met by increasing disquiet from the Reich 
Audit Office, the Reichsrechnungshof. For one thing, the Audit Office began to 
worry about the costs of the winter service, which according to it already 
amounted to more than 13,000 Reichsmark during the winter of 1935/36 for the 
route section between Frankfurt and Heidelberg alone.26 But it was not the 
sheer costs of the winter service alone that worried the Reichsrechnungshof: Its 
main concern was that a newly established winter service could result in a new 
legal understanding that it was the duty of the state to fulfil this task – a devel-
opment that could ultimately produce high costs for the state in all those cases 
where this new demand or expectation had not been met.27 The Rechnungshof 
therefore pleaded that, prior to a general practice of snow removal and road 
                                                             
22 The discovery of the importance of resilient responses towards hazards and risks is explored 
more extensively in this issue by Nicolai Hannig in his article. 
23 An example of this scientific seeking of a solution: BArch R4601/518 Teil 2, with lots of 
information on the experiences of the winter service in various regions and the develop-
ment of snow ploughs. 
24 BArch 4601/519, Letter of the Oberpräsident of East Prussia to the Landesbauamt, 8th 
February 1937. 
25 BArch R 4601/523 GI, H. Dauppert, Vortrag über Chlorcalcium, gehalten auf der Forschungs-
gesellschaft für das deutsche Straßenwesen e.V. in Dresden am 22.11.38 (lecture on chlor-
calcium). 
26  BArch R 2301/5821, Letter from the Audit Office to Todt, 15 May 1936. 
27  Ibid., Letter from the Audit Office to Todt, 9 July 1936. 
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gritting, a law had to be passed that protected the state against any claims for 
damages by road users.28  
In spite of the concerns by the Audit Office, Todt even intensified his at-
tempts to establish a winter service in Germany, complaining about the poor 
quality of the German system compared to the situation in South Tyrol.29 To 
avoid any legal consequences of these activities, Todt stressed to his staff that his 
orders had only been internal instructions. The Rechnungshof was incensed. In a 
phone conversation and a heated exchange of letters, the civil servant Dr. Martin 
Winzerling warned Todt against great costs that might be the result of such a 
practice. Winzerling argued that car drivers were using the Reichsautobahnen 
fully at their own risk, thus strictly following the established view of the jurisdic-
tion.30 Todt not only rejected the criticism that came from the Rechnungshof; he 
also made it clear that he regarded this intervention as an unacceptable infringe-
ment upon the responsibilities of his office. Nevertheless, Todt assured Win-
zerling that he was doing everything in his power to avoid further additional costs 
for the state that could possibly result from compensation claims in cases of 
accidents caused by black ice.  
The concerns of the Reichsrechnungshof about Todt’s plans were, however, 
not unfounded. While the office of the Generalinspektor and the Reichsrech-
nungshof were still debating the necessity to remove snow and to grit the roads 
in 1937 and 1938, the legal debate and jurisdiction began to change significant-
ly. An increasing number of lawyers and legal experts now suggested that it 
was, after all, indeed the duty of the state to protect its citizens from dangerous 
slippery roads. In 1935, the lawyer Dr Hermann Ketterer published a scientific 
legal analysis of the obligation to grit under German law. Even though he rep-
resented precisely the jurisprudential communis opinio that a general obligation 
to provide safe roads in the winter did not exist, he questioned the validity of 
this position quite openly. Like Todt he argued that, given the increasing mo-
torisation in Germany, the traditional attitude towards a road service during the 
winter had to be changed (Ketterer 1935, 5-6, 83-4). However, Ketterer’s pre-
cise reasoning differed from Todt’s position. While Todt was at pains to stress in 
his writings both to his subordinates as well as to the Reichsrechnungshof that 
this service had a voluntary character, Ketterer suggested that changed societal 
practices and expectations had an impact on the meaning of the law. The ra-
tionale of such a legal reasoning was that, in the context of an increasingly motor-
ised society, the same standard of safety and security the state provided in other 
areas could be expected for traffic as well. If this legal reasoning had become the 
new prevailing opinion in the legal literature, it would have meant immediate 
consequences for the social and political practices and their legality. In other 
                                                             
28  Ibid., Letter from the Audit Office to Todt, 3 July 1936. 
29  BArch 4601/518 Teil 1, Letter by Todt to Min.Rat Gotthold et al., 20th March 1936. 
30  Ibid., Letter by Todt to Winzerling, 6 July 1936. 
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words: While changed expectations and notions of self-evidence had necessi-
tated an adaption of legal ideas, it was exactly these legal concepts that created 
norms for state action.  
Ketterer was not the only legal expert in the 1930s who began to argue that 
the Verkehrssicherungspflicht now extended also to the preparation of roads 
during winter time – the legal debate was in flux. The change even began to 
leave its footprints within the jurisdiction – a development that was noted with 
some concern in the Reichsrechnungshof. Since 1931, it was the position of the 
Supreme Court (the Reichsgericht) that the duty of the state and its local insti-
tutions to safeguard the maintenance of roads could – in principle – also imply 
the duty to grit the roads.31 However, only a couple of years later, the court 
decided that such a duty will often prove to be impossible to fulfil as it would 
be too costly and sometimes also technically impossible – state institutions 
were not even obliged to block roads in the event of dangerous weather. Ac-
cording to the Court, it was up to the driver whether he wanted to use an obvi-
ously slippery road or not. If he chose to do so, it was up to him to exert the 
necessary caution. While some local courts still followed this position – the 
regional court in Hamburg argued, for instance, that a decision as to whether a 
slippery road should be gritted or not lay within the administrative discretion of 
the state and its institutions – the demand for action by the state was clearly 
rising in the jurisdictions. Local and regional courts decided in several cases 
after the mid-1930s that the state or its local institutions was obliged to take 
care of the safety of roads even outside of built-up areas. The courts made their 
decisions dependent upon two conditions – first, that local authorities were 
actually able to do something against black ice and second, that the dangerous 
road conditions had persisted over an extended period of time.32 As the legal 
debate dragged on, it became increasingly clear that the legal communis opinio 
was shifting towards a new understanding of the Verkehrssicherungspflicht, 
implicating an obligation of the state to prevent car drivers from risks that 
resulted from hazardous road conditions. It is highly probable that such a 
change of both the scholarly legal prevailing opinion and the jurisdiction indi-
cated a general shift in the public expectations towards risk management by the 
state (Würtenberger 1991).  
This change was closely monitored by both the Reichsrechnungshof and 
members of the staff of the Generalinspektor. In 1938, Reichsbahnoberrat 
Brunner, a civil servant working for the office of Fritz Todt, rejected claims by 
Werner Weigelt, one of the most prolific authors on the subject, that under 
certain conditions the state-owned company that ran the motorways was 
obliged to reduce risks and protects users of the motorways. Weigelt had ques-
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court decision from 23 September 1931, IX 195/31). 
32  BArch R112/281, fol. 38. 
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tioned the validity of the old, formerly prevailing, argument that the gritting of 
roads was too costly and that the Verkehrssicherungspflicht therefore did not 
fully apply during the winter. According to Weigelt, the state-owned company 
was legally obliged to keep motorways open to traffic even under difficult 
circumstances because it had the financial means. Weigelt’s argument contrast-
ed sharply with the opinion of Brunner, who held fast to the view that it lay in 
the responsibility of the individual driver to adapt to road conditions and avoid 
driving on roads in hazardous weather conditions. However, Brunner’s position 
was in even sharper contrast to the assessment of the lawyer Fischer. Fischer, 
who joined the debate at around the same time, argued that Brunner’s concept 
of individual responsibility was a leftover of the old, but long gone age of 
extreme liberalism. In the new age of Gemeinschaft, all participants in the 
traffic systems formed a community, which could only thrive if its various 
parts supported each other. One of the most important components of this 
community, Fischer argued, was the institution that was dealing with the 
maintenance of roads, for instance the state-owned organisation that ran the 
Reichsautobahn. It was also a member of the national socialist Verkehrsge-
meinschaft and therefore obliged to do its part for the well-being of the other 
elements within this community. 
It is obvious that Fischer’s reasoning was heavily affected by the national 
socialist ideology – he was talking about community and not about the state 
and its Verkehrssicherungspflicht. The sphere of legal debates was one of those 
areas that were particularly prone to the influence of national socialist ideology. 
This was especially true for notions of statehood and the relationship between 
state institutions and citizens. Even though the road maintenance obligation 
was regarded as a civil law aspect, it almost exclusively concerned the state (or 
at least state-owned) institutions, as most roads were owned by the state and its 
subsidiaries. Hence the legal concept of Verkehrssicherungspflicht mainly 
addressed the relationship between the state and its road users and, in doing so, 
it depicted the state as the institution that was obliged to give its citizens access 
to the elements of modern life. This obligation stemmed from the fact that the 
state was the only institution with the financial and material capabilities to 
provide these elements of modern life. The renowned public law expert, Ernst 
Forsthoff, had developed the underlying concept of this reasoning in the mid-
1930s. He argued that, in modern industrial societies, individuals had lost au-
tonomous access to the means with which they could organise their life on their 
own. The main reasons for this were population growth and urbanisation – both 
leading to a greater distance between those areas where people actually lived 
(mainly cities and towns) and those areas that were used by society to support 
itself. Technical advance, as it was expressed in electricity, streets and automo-
bile traffic, could compensate for this gap and ensure the survival and welfare of 
the individual members of society. Forsthoff called the use of these techniques 
Daseinsvorsorge (services that had the function of providing for one’s life) and 
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he was convinced that Daseinsvorsorge could only be organised within the mutu-
al solidarity of social groups. Under the national socialist system, the political 
institutions and the state were the ones that had took up the task to provide the 
essential utilities for modern life (Schütte 2006; Stolleis 2002, 203-5).  
It was a concept that contrasted sharply to what national socialist lawyers 
like Fischer regarded as an ultra-liberal concept of the state that solely consist-
ed of a legal framework for human behaviour (Stolleis 2014, 128). The envi-
sioned central role of the state in the Daseinsvorsorge also had repercussions 
on notions of responsibility in risky and hazardous situations. According to this 
concept, if the state had the means to provide for safe roads even during winter 
time, it was its duty to do so and not the driver’s responsibility to evaluate 
whether he could risk driving on those roads or not. Todt’s own position to-
wards a winter service on the Reichsautobahnen followed exactly the same 
reasoning.  
However, one should not jump to conclusions and attribute the shift in the 
legal implications of risk and responsibility solely to national socialist ideolo-
gy. Rather, it seems that legal experts of the ‘Third Reich’ had taken up and 
intensified developments with origins in the 1920s. Forsthoff’s concept of 
Daseinsvorsorge, for instance, linked up very well with a more general turn in 
the legal debates since the 1920s that stressed the role of law in creating social 
and political conditions that were fair and just and counteracted social inequali-
ty (Radbruch 1957). Fischer’s ideas were therefore not only influenced by 
particular national socialist legal notions. They were part of a general turn in 
legal discussions both on responsibilities for risky situations in modern motor-
ised traffic and on the function of law (Seelmann 2001, 83) and the role of the 
state in general. It stood for the increasingly powerful legal concept that the 
state had to provide certain levels of security even in spheres where these as-
pects of statehood were barely existent before – a result of changed notions of 
self-evidence that were mirrored by legal debates. Automobile traffic had be-
come normal and more common since the mid-1920s. Lorries became popular 
as practical vehicles for the transport of goods, triggering a widespread debate 
among traffic experts about how to organise motorised traffic (Schlimm 2011; 
Möser 2002, 107-10; Kopper 2002, 12-4). At the same time, increasing public 
enthusiasm about the technical abilities of motorised traffic found expression in 
highly popular motor races where people were stunned and excited about the 
speed modern vehicles could reach (Borscheid 2004, 196-213). These elements 
as well as a growing presence of cars in daily traffic contributed to a familiarisa-
tion of the public with motorised traffic and its implications, like for instance the 
experience of speed and accidents (Möser 2009). Cars and their technical proper-
ties challenged established expectations and self-evidences that had governed 
behaviour on the roads and that were both strengthened and reflected by the law. 
The change in legal concepts about how to distribute the management of risky 
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situations in traffic was therefore also a result of changed realities and corre-
sponding public perceptions and expectations.  
For the Reichsrechnungshof, this change was unwelcome, but it was swift to 
draw its conclusions from the development of the legal discourse. As early as 
in 1937, it recommended in a letter to the Inspector General that data be col-
lected about accidents that were the result of hazardous winter weather. By that 
stage, Todt’s office had, however, already fully introduced a still largely unof-
ficial, but extensive winter service for the motorways. In May 1937, the office 
of the Generalinspektor proudly asserted that ‘in contrast to earlier measures 
there is now a real winter service’ in Germany. ‘In a generous way, it has been 
attempted to keep roads open during the whole winter.’33 The assumption that it 
was the task of state agencies to provide safe roads was in stark contrast to the 
original attitude of the Reichsrechnungshof that laid the burden of responsibil-
ity solely with the car driver. The introduction of the winter service in the year 
1936/37 was, in any case, only the beginning. In the following months, Todt 
established a scientific centre for research into the properties of snow, collected 
data about the quality of snow ploughs that were available on the German 
market and about the best material for gritting roads. It was now, after all, the 
state that had become responsible for the winter conditions on the streets. 
6.   Law and Everyday Risks as Historical Forces  
The developments in the 1930s that created a winter service on the streets 
marked a significant shift in the role of the state in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. While the accident involving the French ambassador and 
his wife raised some attention in Berlin, it was at the same time clear that this 
attention was caused by the fact that persons of public interest were involved. 
Winter and its hazards were a natural phenomenon against which only very 
limited protection was available. The introduction of a winter service in the 
1930s signalled a shift in two ways: it indicated a changed role of the state and 
its institutions and represented a changed attitude towards nature. Its challenges 
and hazards were no longer interpreted as dangers and threats whose effects 
could hardly be controlled. They now seemed to be manageable and even pre-
ventable if state institutions took appropriate measures. Winter as a season 
became a phenomenon something could be done about.  
It followed from this proposition that state institutions were obliged to pro-
tect road users from black ice and snowdrifts. It also followed from this propo-
sition that the altered character of the now seemingly manageable risk changed 
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the role of car driver. He was now increasingly seen as a person who was af-
fected by a risk rather than responsible for it. Undoubtedly, these developments 
owed a lot to specific political developments in the late 1930s. Todt wanted 
safe roads in the winter not least because it was in the interest of the prestigious 
project of the successfully constructed motor ways. Additionally, the legal 
debates themselves in the 1930s were influenced by the national socialist ide-
ology of the day. However, the essence of the debate took place independently 
from what happened on the political level and reflected a shift in the notion of 
social justice and the role of the state that was not originally triggered by the 
‘Third Reich.’ Rather, the debate about risks and responsibility and about the 
functions and tasks of the state reflected a gradual shift in the legal literature 
that dated back to the 1920s. 
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court had exempted state insti-
tutions from having to take action against black ice and from the general duty 
to keep roads open and safe only because it had regarded such a duty as being 
economically and technically unfeasible. After the late 1920s when this argu-
ment increasingly lost ground, both regional courts and legal scholars began to 
acknowledge that the Verkehrssicherungspflicht also extended to hazardous 
weather during winter time. The legal debate was important, as it not only 
reflected the rising motorisation in Germany and the increasing technical abili-
ties to prevent icy road conditions – it also followed own intrinsic rules. The 
law was not only reacting to changing circumstances, it was at the same time 
an accelerating element in the establishment of a new role of state institutions. 
Law adapts to changed notions of self-evidence, and the course of the legal 
discussions since the 1920s was a fair reflection of changed social expectations 
concerning state action against road hazards, but it also gave these notions of 
self-evidence a legal character by interpreting established legal concepts in the 
light of these discourses and attitudes. In doing so, however, it also changed the 
content of these notions by adjusting them to existing legal principles. The 
reason for the intense debate between the Reichsrechnungshof and the Inspec-
tor General about the introduction of a general winter service was the fact that 
the legal debates not only represented changed public expectations, but they 
could have costly financial consequences. 
Law was therefore an influential force in constructing the management of 
everyday risks in Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. It thereby 
influenced the role of the state that was now in charge of areas and problems 
which hitherto had either not been regulated at all or had been the responsibil-
ity of individuals who chose to take those risks (like, for instance, driving on 
the roads during the winter). In doing so, it also reinforced societal notions of 
social justice and thus influenced the relationship between individual rights, on 
the one hand, and community rights on the other. As had already occurred in 
other fields of risk mitigation, concepts of individual responsibility were grad-
ually being mixed in the field of road traffic and replaced with a risk manage-
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ment that was based both on the distribution of costs among larger parts of 
society and the provision of safety and security by the state. The burden of 
prevention was shifted from the car driver, who had to act responsibly in the 
face of difficult and hazardous weather conditions, to the state and its institu-
tions, which had to create conditions that made driving even in hazardous 
weather conditions safe. This kind of new Daseinsvorsorge was not primarily a 
result of the late 1930s alone, but a consequence of new social practices and a 
legal debate that reflected these changes. 
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